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~ ANDREWS Federal/Civi2;..., ...;,., Timely 
~~" 1. SUMMARY: This li~r''s rule again: 
~;;.,.__e,mploying par~nt~lle~£!:i:.ldren. In an attack by resps, two black fe m ale 
~~teacher aides, the DC (N.D. Miss., Keady, C. J.) found the rule void under (a ) the 
raditional equal prOtection test (an irrational classification); (b) due process (an 
t{/l..J irrebutable presumption of immorality); and (c) strict eqnal protection (a snspe ct ~ 
r---' "'\ 
~~ SU- • 
,t/) .- " based classification). CA 5 affirmed on the first two, not reaching (c). 
T1MA.- (}uJL ' 
f~ 
- z_ --
2. FACTS: In spring oL 1972, school. superintendent ·Pettey (a petr), 
distnrbed by knowledge that some teacher aides were parents of illegitimate children, 
promulgated nnwritten instrn-ctions to Mrs· . . McCorkle, administrator in: charge of the 
teacher aide pr-ogram, that parentage of an- illegitimate child ·wo,,ld henceforth 
L/ 
disqualify instrnctionai personnel~ . inc,,mbent or.·applicant; .. from employment. The 
School Board,. •Tnaware of the r.11re nntiL snit wa·s filed; later . ratified it ' an ct the actions 
taken against resps. Resps Rogers and:Andrews were both 11nmarrie:d mothers of an 
illegitimate child.. Rogers, . an. ihC11mbent· in· '71--72~ was not ·.rehir_ed;:.Andrews, an 
applicant after the rnie' s pr.omnlgation-, . wa·s not ·hired.ior :the .Jan.- '73· .semester. 
Both were otherwise gnalified.;: as to each; . the action.s were c-based -sol-eJ:y' on the rnle. 
Three rationales were offered· below, . throngp: which :the r•rle was said to 
advance the perrn..is sible end· or fostering;, a: pr.oper:-moral :clifnate .in p~tr' s schools: 
(:E.) St•liC_h parenthood is prima· facie_ proof'oLimmorality; (ZL st,ch parents present 
impro•per role models for. stndi:mts; and· (31 their:·employment_ Tnaterially contribntes to 
the problem of scJiooigirL pregnancies-. . Tiie ·- rrc- rnled ·the .Erst invalid as a classifying 
mechanism,. since teachers- with present·. and 'demonstrable .good moral chciracter are 
antcnmaticaiiy inchded an the. basi's of a . past; . irr:evocable -,event; . whereas those \\·hose 
present illicit s-exna.I behavior.. might render them nnfit were :exclnde·d from the class 
if no child res,Tlted or if an_ abortion· were pr.oc11 red . . Similarly; nnder dne-proceE s, 
Nb the rule was· void for estabri's:hing an arbitrary -and ·irrebnttable presnm:ption of bad 
]/ 
J 
Testifying, Pettey- eraborated.on the scope . of the n :rle,.: stating tl'I<it it wo,ld 
inc]~Tde~ ~·· s·ecr·etaries, . librarians·, . cafeteria .workers;- . vobi.nteers-, ~ and PTA 
presidents,. bnt probably not. bns drivers -, . janitors, . and maids,, - ----- -
- -3 ·. _ -
moral character from the proven fact of illegitih1.ate parenta g e. CA 5 a dopted t he 
DC's rea s oning, citing Cleveland Bd. of Ed,c. v . . LaFlenr, 414 U.S. 6 32 (1 9 74 ). 
CA. 5, , noting that a state statute was available to remove or suspend teachers for 
* 
immoral conduct, after a p:ublic hearing, also held that to deny those a ff ecte d by t} 
petr' s rule the benefit of that is. itself to violate equal prot e ct ion. 
....._,- -- . _._....._ , 
As to (2) and (3) above, the DC; noting that the conflicting expe rt testimony 
was of a "judgmental .nature" unsupported by solid fac.tnal basis, found the lik elihoc 
oi. inferred learning by_ sttJdents from. such a teacher /parent "highly improba b l e ". 
Fu·rther, . there wa·s -no e:vidence .that .resps pnblicized their statns or prosely ti ze d a 
i:ts. desirability. CA .5: ag_reed, . distinguishing McConnell v. Anders on, 4 51 F. 2d 19 
(CA 8 19TI ~), . where university regents .-declined to hire a teacher not becanse he wa 
hon1.osexoal- b1Jt becanse. of.his .' activis.t ·role in .advocating s a me, snch t hat to have h 
him· wm,la· have indiCated tacit approval by the nniv.ersity. Examining (3) a b o\·e, 
GA. 5. f.cmnd· no factnaLs11pport in the record • . CA. 5 ·did. not reach the DC' s fin d i ng t h 
the. r.nle . a s.: applied created a · snspect ·sex classifiC:atiorr, as to which no co m pe ll ing 
s:ta:te. ihte.res.t had been shown .. 
3.:.. GD.N TENT IONS= 
* (a:.) · Petr contends that resps t claim fails iLthey have no constitntional right /.. 
he.a:r illegitimate children, s ·ince they otherwise have no claim to continned e mp l oy-
mentnnder.. Bd. of Re g ents v. Roth; 408 u·.·s.- 564 {l972l: Resps assert t h at t h e 
interest. at. stake is withiri the . 14th A .. ~ s protection of. ' 1libe rty"; and tha t t h e rul e 
impinges on .the fundamental right to bear children . . Fu-rther, apart fro m any H th 
A. . right, . tho. e.gual .p-rntection· clause is -a .barrier again·st irrational cla ss if ic a ti on s . 
<"' ..... r~, 
- -4 
(b) P e tr argues that the rule was adopted not on the basis that such p a rent 's a r 
presently immoral b\1t on the reasonable edncational gronnd that they are imprope r 
models for the roles occ11pied by the teacher, i.e., "edncator, adviser, friend, and , 
at times, parent-snbstitnte . . '' Goss v.- Lopez, 419 U". S.- 565; 594 (1975) (Pov;ell, J., 
dissenting). The expert testimony ignored by the lower courts supports the prop o siti< 
that students d·o find out about teachers' private lives and that inierred 1Ja rning fr om 
tea~her' s status as parent· of an illegitimate .child can and does oc·cur. To bar th o se 
adults of that status is thus rationally related to the .permis·sible ed\1cational end of 
fm.stering proper societaL models. Resps state that by eschewing _rationales ( l) and 
((3) above, petr is in effect r .eargning .the evidence, .since all three were fonnd (fro m 
Pettey's testimony) to be the. asserted bases for the .rl.Tle, .and all were advanced b e for 
<CA 5. In any case, . resps align themselves with CA 5.: 
(c) Petr c.ontends that . hypothetical applications of the rnle· to third parties, 
e. g. , birth incident to rape, . cited by the .lower . conrts as. exemplary- of arbitrarine ss , 
shonld not be considered. Under U~S. _v. Raines, 362 U~'S.: 17_"(19.60), resps, '\vho 
v0Iuntarily engaged in illicit conduct, cannot be heard to raise possible uncon s titution ~ 
applications of the rule. No· specific . answer by resps,. although LaFleur is cited 
throughout. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petr' s Regents argurrent is inapposite·, this plainly not be ing 
a cr:ase of procedurar protections attendant ·to the loss of a state-c-reated right, but in 
the first instance a straightforward equal protection claim. Neither: the benefit d e nie c 
nmr the burden i:mposed by ·the classification need implicate. a .specific . constitutio nal 
:rright in order to trigger traditional eqnal 'protection analysis~ : . 
_, I 
- -5-
As to the ''in'1proper model" rationale, the lower conrts conch1sion tha t i t ,,·as 
a.n irrational basis for the rule remains open for question: a school board might we ll 
reasonably find that the presence of. a teacher, . known by impressionable stndents t o b 
sncch a parent, does impart a degree of cnltnral learning and perhaps tacit appro ,·a l b· 
the '''authority" represented by the school .itself. . Tending to erode the judgment of 
reasonableness, however·, is Pettey's testimonythat he wonldincl.J,de, ~.__g_:__, ca fet e r i 
workers within the rnle. That stndents might look to them as role models seems 
highly qnestionable.. I. view rationality nnder. traditional eqnal protection as a close 
G'nestion. 
LaFle,H' s reasoning wonld initially appear ,,navailable here nnder \Vein be r g:e 
v. Salfi, No. 74-214 (J,me 26), . which seems to reserve "ir:reb11ttable. presnmption" 
analysis for those cases where the statnte "constitnte[s] a hea·vy bJrden on the 
exe:.cise Of •· •• •• JYI.Otected' f:reedoms, II namely, . 11freedOll'1 Of personal Choice in 
matters of marriage and family life [aslone . of the liberties protected by the .. 
Fourteenth Amendment •. " Slip Op~ . at . 19~ . qnoting from LaFlenr,- 414 u: S. at 639 - 6-l 
The crucial issue,. then, under Salfi 1 s interpretation of LaFleur (and Sta nley ....... 
l!llinois, 405 U .. S .. 645 (1972)) is whether. resps have a ·protected freedom to bear, b) 
design or inadvertence, a child out of ·wedlock, . exercising that ·"choice" in lieu of 
CID>ntraception a:r: abortion . . The general power of .the .States over matters of mora l s 
specifically to pr-ohibit fornication, . militates against protected sta-tus ·; the ong oing 
emergence of alternative life styles · -- - open rnarriage, no 1narriage, . or even c:1il cl -
raising by- single persons - points in the opposite direction; See E1sens taclt ....... B a 
405 U~S .. 438,. 453-45'4 (1972). 
This· seems to be. a s-olid candidate for : ce rt; . 
There is a response. . . 
1 l I!.I I 75 Mason DC '1>:. CA 5 op s 
petn · 
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Noe 74-1318 Joint Motion to Dispense 
with Printing the Appendix 
DREW MUNICIPAL 
S~PARATE SC HOOL DIST. Jl • c1\e ed ~~cJ ~~ ... GV'\) 
13>v-t <3\~ '\V..~ ' ~ ~\A..- ~ 
..L see \1\iJ ~ IVv\ ~ -- :J 
ANDREWS ~. 
6# the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to consider 
\\CQ~'s 
\€'()w.\ r\"1 ~ t he constitutionality of petr 1 s rule against employing parents of illegitimate 
"\\ ~ ~~ · uJ\ children. 
~~~ 
~e ~ ~e o~ The partie s now move to dispense,.;.ith the !,.:._quirem.!nt of an appendix 
~~·and to proce e d on the original record. See Rule 36(8). The parties note that 
........ ,-, au: J?Sac ~ 
the record in thi s c ase c onsists of 11 128 pages and that "[a]fter conferences 
with attorneys fo r all parties, it appears that the entire record would have to 
be p r inted as the s ingle Appendix. " They approximate that the cost of printing 
the entire record would be $5, 500. Of this amount, about half would have to be 
- 2 -
advanced by resps, 'a-pparently because petr does not-tonsider that parts 
designated by resps are necessary. See Rule 36(3). 
a re paupers. (They have not filed a motion to proceed IFP.) Petr states that 
~
i t i s a small rural school district with a limited budget. They note that the 
c ase proc e eded in CA 5 on the original record. Both parties urge that they 
w ould incur great financial hardship if required to bear the cost of printing the 
Appendix . 
Should the Court deny their motion1 the parties seek additional time in 
which to designate and cross-designate the portions of the record to be printed. 
DISCUSSION: For some reason, the Court has had a rash of these motions 
l ately. See , e. g. 1 motions in American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, No. 74-
1481, List 1, Sheet 4, this Conference and TSC Industries vg Northway, Inc. 1 
No. 74-1471, List 3, Sheet 3, this Conference. 
The parties appear to be misconstruing the purpose of the Courtts Rule. 
Basically, a printed appendix is for the convenience of the members of the Court 
i n studying the case. (It also helps in storing, filing, binding, etc.) Rule 36(1) 
r equires that the appendix contain (1) relevant docket entries; (2) relevant pleadings, 
f indings, opinions, etc.,; (3) the judgment, order or decision in question; and 
(4) 11any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the Court1 s 
particular attention. 11 (emphasis added) The Rule also provides the mechanisms 
for designation and cross-designation and specifically adrr10nishes: 
11In designating parts of the record 
for inclusion in the appendix, the parties 
shall have regard for the fact that the record 
on file with the clerk is always available to 
the court for reference and examination ahd 
shall not engage in unnecessary designation. 11 
Rule 36 (2 ). 
- 3 -
As pointed out by Me'"s'srso Boskey and Gressman, by-{his provision the Court 
had hoped that the printed appendix would be kept to a minimum. Boskey and 
Gressman, The 1967 Changes in the Supreme Court1 s RulesJ> 42 F.R.D. 139, 151. 
The authors warned, however : 
It may be inevitable that the natural tendency 
of lawyers is to seek to protect their clients1 
interests by printing more than is necessary, 
simply out of an abundance of caution. But if 
the bar discerns the Court1 s purpose from the 
clear statement in the 196 7 rules., there is 
ground for hoping that the appendix system 
will result in substantially fewer pages of the 
certified record being printed. 11 Ibid. 
~I:? 
The members of the bar obviously have not 11discerned 11 the Court1 s purpose. 
" 
If there is nothing in the record which the parties wish to direct the 
Court1 s particular attention, then they should say so and state as their ground 
for dispensing with a printed appendix that the judgment and opinion below are 
already printed in the petition, as is the case. This is the ground on which 
the' Court traditionally has granted such motions. To assert that the parties 
can only agree that the appendix should contain the entire record and, therefore, 
that the appendix should be dispensed with because of costs is somewhat of a 
nonsequitor. And, in any event, high printing costs are one way of encouraging 
compliance with the spirit of Rule 36. 
As to the parties alternative motion for an extension of time in which 
to file an appendix, this w0uld appear to fall within the province of the Clerk. 
See Rule 36(a). 
This 1s a joint motion~ 
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January 9~ 1976 Conference 
List 7, Sheet 2 
No. 74-1318 
DREW MUNICIPAL 
SEPARATE SCHOOL DIST. 
v. 
ANDREWS 
Motion of Re sps to Proceed 
Further Herein IFP. 
On October 6, the Court granted cert to CA 5 in this case to consider the 
constitutionality of petr 1 s policy barring employment of unwed parents of illegiti-
mate children as teachers and teachers aides. 
Resps now seek leave to proceed IFP. They both attach affidavits that 
their respective incomes are $675.00 and $400.00 per month. They fear the 
potential assessment of the approximately $3, 500 cost of preparing petr 1 s brief 
and appendix, which figure represents 43% and 73% respectively, of their annual 
salaries. Resps ask that they be relieved of the potential obligation of paying 
any fees and costs, and that the United States pay the costs of printing their briefs. 
....... _ -- - 2 -
See Rule 53(7). They state that they were granted leave to proceed IFP in the 
CA 11for purposes of appealing on the record below. 11 
. 
DISCUSSION: Resps not only fail to de~ide the $3,500 figure between 
them, but err in believing that they are potentially liable for the cost of printing 
petr 1 s brief. The only costs taxable are those of printing the record and the 
appendix and the Clerk's $100 fee for filing.. The awarding of costs is also a 
discretionary matter and, if the judgment below is reversed, the Court may 
decide not to award costs. 
It is not clear what re sps mean when they state they were allowed to 
proceed in forma pauperis 11for purposes of appealing on the record below. 11 
Apparently, they did not proceed IFF in the trial court. 
As to the 11printing 11 of their brief, resps may not be aware of the relaxed 
standards set forth in Snider v. All State Administrators, 414 UQ S. 685 (1974). 
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CERT. MERITS MOTION AB-
~~---r---SrT_A_TE~Mr-E_N~T---+---.--+---r-~SENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Carl R. Schenker DATE: January 23, 1976 
No. 74-1318 Drew Municipal Separate School Dist. v. Andrews 
I recommend that this case be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. If the merits must be reached I 
recommend affirmance. 
1. Prelude. I consider the constitutional questions 
lurking around this case to be very difficult. Leaving aside 
the possible differential impact on women and blacks of the Pettey 
Rule, the case poses serious questions about the scope of the 
right to privacy and the legitimacy of the State's 
proselytizing for traditional moral values. 
I doubt that a statute making it a crime to conceive 
a child out of wedlock would be constitutional. But 
different questions are posed by the power of the state 
. ~ r- to require that those in the especially sensitive job of 
~A o ' '? 
·~tedching not lend credence to anti-establishment views on ? 
-~ 
1 
• matters of morals. (In this respect compare the inability of 
~~~,.._ 
the State to prosecute possession of obscenity within the 
home (Stanley v. Georgia) to the ability of the state to 
restrict commercial dissemination of obscenity(~.~., Miller).) 
2. 
If an appropriately narrow state policy were pursued to 
prevent school teachers from encouraging anti-establishment 
moral behavior, I think it might well be constitutional. 
We have here, however, no such appropriately narrow state ...... 
policy. Here a yahoo promulgated a ridiculously overinclusive 
~ 
rule just because he didn't like having unwed parents around the 
school. I think the Court should be wary about getting 
dragged into such a case. 
2. Improvident Grant. If you have not read the 
amicus brief by the National Education Assn, I suggest that 
you consult its Part II. There the NEA points out that 
there is no need for this Court to reach the constitutional 
questions posed in this case because of the recent promulgation 
of Title IX regulations. It appears that Drew is a recipient of 
federal educational funds (see note 12 of the NEA brief). Under 
the Title IX regulations sex-discrLminatory employment practices 
cannot be followed at such schools unless they are shown to be 
demonstrably job related. These regulations were not in force 
when this case was decided below. But in the future a rule 
such as this - which the record establishes will be enforced 
primarily against women - must measure up to the requirements of 
Title IX. Since such regulations must meet statutory 
restrictions in the future, there is no need for this Court 
3. 
to consider the constitutional difficulties. 
Given the promulgation of the Title IX regulations 
and the tough constitutional questions involved here, I think 
the Court should dismiss the case as improvidently granted.~ 
3. The merits. The principal question on the 
merits is whether this rule is sufficiently related to promotion 
of a legitimate state interest. I presume for present purposes 
that the promotion of traditional moral values is a legitimate 
state interest at least in this context. Therefore an 
appropriately related state policy could be followed with 
regard to the employment of unwed parents. But it must be 
recognized that such a policy does impinge on sex-related 
areas of privacy. This Court has recognized (1) that policies 
affecting sexual privacy generally must have a significant 
justification (Roe v. Wade; LaFleur) and (2) that such privacy 
rights inhere in the unmarried as well as the married. 
(See Doe v. Bolton; Eisenstadt v. Baird.) As a result, the 
Pettey Rule should require rather impressive justification. 
That justification ha s not been forthcoming here, 
where it is sheer presumption that the children are at all aware 
of the unmarried status of the teachers. I am not sure at 
present what kind of rule I would find sufficiently related to the 




context before employment could be denied. (Cf. LaFleur.) 
In any event, there seems to be so little reason behind this 
particular rule that it should be found to be a violation 
of either due process or equal protection. 
Carl 
________ , ___ _ 
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Re: Drew Municipal School Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318 
A. Improvident Grant. 
District Court decision--July 1973 
CAS decision--Feb. 1975 
Promulgation of Title IX-~egs--July 1975 
Grant--October 1975 
This case thus meets your criteria for an improvident grant: There 
has been a significant intervening event between the lower court ---- - - -
decisions and the grant. That event was not reflected in the 
certiorari papers. 
B. Merits. 
I will not burden you with a lengthy memo this morning 
(and hopefully never). 
1. RMX~('~Policy"v. Rule 
You asked whether any difference would be made if we treated 
this case as simply several instances of refusals to hire, rather 
than as a state rule (since it has never been very formalized). 
I believe this distinction would have only one relevance 
that would not make much difference in this case. As a general 
matter I think there is no requirement that state laws be written, 
so we should be hesitant to say this was not a law in any event. 
But even if we reached that conclusion, «aRKkiax constitutional 
guarantees do not turn on the existence of a law. The administrative 
application of a neutral state law can arise to an equal protection 
violation. (In the famous Yick Wo case a facially neutral licensing 
statute was used to discriminate against Chinese by the administra-
tors.) Similarly, an administrative ~KX policy that was 
discriminatory in its application would violate equal protection 
even if there was no formalized state law that appeared neutral 
on its face. Thus, for example, if a KI« law school run by the 
state merely has vague and unspecified admissions criteria but 
used them so as to exclude all MIXK black applicants, there would 
be an equal protection violation. (This is DeFunis in reverse.) 
To summarize, three kinds of state behavior can rise to equal 
protection violations: 
(a) a rule of law--whether formal or informal, written or oral 
(b) the KM discriminatory application of an apparently 
neutral rule of law (Yick Wo) 
(c) the discriminatory ~IXKX admin5tration of a discretionary 
system (~eFunis) 
As far as applying this scheme to this case, I come up with 
the following; (Remember that this goes only to an analytical 
framework, not to the merits) This case presents either an (a) 
or a (c) situation. That is, we either have Pettey's Rule as a rule 
of law or we have Pettey applying vague criteria for teacher 
hiring in such XK a way as to discriminate (though perhaps per-
missibly) against the parents of illegitimates. 
In all K~ likelihood, however, we do not have a (b) situation. 
That is, assuming that Pettey's Rule is a rule of law, there has 
been no real proof of its discriminatory application. In my mind 
this X~ tends to take t~e sex discrimination and race discrimination 
claims out of the case. XX Such claims would be stronger if over 
a long period of time only black females were discharged under this 
rule, especially if it could be proved that whites and/or men were 
not moved against. It may be that the record supports some 
sexual discrimination claim insofar as there was testimony from 
the administrators that thef had not really investigated men. 
2. KM Analysis on the merits. 
Here I adhere basically to what I said in my first KM memo. 
Pettey's Ru~e zeros in on the parents MXXItXK~XKtMMKMK of illegitimate 
The cases in this Court give considerable substance to the notion 
that procreation is a liberty interest that deserves protection 
whether one is single or married. (Roe; Doe; Eisenstadt; Gris-
wold; Skinner; LaFleur.) When such an interest is impacted upon 
by Kk a law, the state should be required to give substantial 
justification. Perhaps the best analysis of this problem ~ 
would be to require that school boards can act against the parents 
of illegitimates only if they advocate unwed parenthood or 
undeniably communicate it to the children (e.g, by being pregnant 
during the school year). 
I might add that on the K merits, this can be analyzed KKXKXKkKX 
KK~XIX~MKKKXIMKXK more easily as a due process case in the 
(unless we get into sex discrim.) 
Roe-Doe sense than as an equal protection case/ But the gen~ralized 
XKKM remarks about whether the Pettey Rule is a rule of law, etc., 
would apply in that context as well as in the context of equal 
protection analysis. 
3-5-76 CRS for LFP 
DREW CAPSULIZATION 
1. Constitutional guarantees apply outside the realm of formally 
written statutes. 
(a) There can be informal, written rules of law. 
;Even 
(b) Eexa if there is nothing that can be characterized as 
a ru~e of law on its face, a pattern or practice of administrative 
behavior can operate de facto XXX as a rule of law. 
Here it is admitted that there is either a rule of law 
or a practice that focuses on the parents of illegitimates. Thus 
that focus must be justified. ~XM~MXKIIJ But there is 
no admission of a focus on women or blacks, so that practice need 
not be justified. (Some record of uneven application of the rule 
to women or blacks HMHXMM could be made over time however. (Yick Wo.) 
2. Due Process. The best way to KKI analyze this case is as a 
liberty interest in ~ pr?creation. The state has a HX valid 
interest also. [I think that the state's interest should not over-
bear the parents unless the parents advocates unwed parenthood in 
the classroom or is demonstrably ~~K~ pregnant. Perhaps in a 
small town like Drew the schoolboard could prove children know 
about their ~XK~KKM teachers private XH lives, but that shouldn't 
be presumed.] 
3. Equal protection. 
(a) This is probably not an equal protection case unless 
we focus on the fact that the rule will usually X get only women, 
and not men. There may be enough proof in the record to support 
a Yick Wo ruling on this point. 
(b) This is not an Eisenstadt case. There there was a discrimina 
tion between married and unmarried people. But the discrimination 
was not relevant to the state purpose of preventing use of contra-
ceptives. The discrimination here is relevant to the legitimate 
purpose or promoting morality. 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWAR T 
-~~ . 
March 8, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1318, Drew Municipal Separate School 
District v. Andrews 
Dear Chief, 
My preference in this case would be a one line 
order without elaboration: The writ is dismissed as 
improvidently granted. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~upum.t QJ{l"lttf of tqc 'J!lniic?t ~taicg 
~aalyin.gLrn. ~. ~· 211-?JL-.;l 
March 8, 197 6 
/ 
Re: 74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews 
MBMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
At Conference it was the consensus that I would 
send a memorandum calling for a DIG and await reaction. 
Some who were for DIG conditioned it on there being 
no writing. 
My sheet shows: 
3 to affirm with DIG as alternative 
4 to reverse with DIG as possible alternative of 
2 of the 4 
2 DIG 
When the dust settles or one week passes, I will 
reassess. It may develop that a memorandum will help 
11 settle the dust. 11 
Regards, 
'II'· 




March 9, 1976 
1_1:;., 







JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
March 9, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 74-1318 Drew Municipal Separate School District 
v. Andrews 
f== wuald joi rr Po MCI s suggesbon for a One line 









.§uvumt ~11u.rt of tqr 'Jlniil'b .§tatc.s 
'Jl!aslrington. p. QJ. 2DpJ!-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 10, 197 6 
Re: No. 74-1318 --Drew Municipal Separate School 
District v. Andrews 
Dear Chief: 
I go for a one-liner in this one. 
The Chief Justice 
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j;uvutttt Qj:cmt ttf tltt ~ttb- j;udtg 
~rurlrittghm. !fl. Qj:. 2.0~Jl.~ 
CHAM BE R S 0~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEVEN S 
March 17, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate 
School District v. Andrews 
Dear Chief: 
Unless someone writes something that requires 
a response, I will join a simple dismissal as 
improvidently granted. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
1st DRAFT 
TO: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Juctice Ste~art 
Mr. Just1ce White 
Mr. Ju;Jtico l''1..r.Jlnl l 
Mr. Justice Blu;'Jlcnn 
Mr. Justice Powsll 
Mr. Justice R""hnquis t 
· Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: APR 2 1 1g76 
Recirculated: _____ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1318 
Drew Municipal Separate 
School District et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Katie Mae Andrews et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
[April -, 1976] 
PER CuRIAM. 
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently 
granted. 
'• ' t-, . .:-, 






.§ltpt".rntt ~ttttd ttf ±:qt ~nittb' ~tattG 
1tJas-4inghm. "lfi. <!J. 211~'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
) 
·r 
April 21, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1318, Drew Municipal Separate School 
District v. Andrews 
Dear Chief, 
I agree with the proposed order in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.§u:prtmr <!fcnrt xrf tqr ~~ .§hrlrs • 
'Dasfri:ngton. ~. <!f. 2llc?'*~ 
C H AMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BR E NNAN, .JR. 
~~. 
April 22, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1318 Drew Municipal Separate School District 
v. Andrews et al. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
1 .. 15z ~ r 
t/ v 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttJlUtttt <!Jcu.d cf tqt ~b ~taUs 
1naaJrittgbm.lB. QJ. 20.?"1.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 22, 1976 
·', 
' ' 
Re: No. 74-1318 -- Drew Municipal Separate School 
District v. Katie Mae Andrews 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with your Per Curiam in this case. 
The Chief Justice 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u:prtntt Q}ltttrl ttf tJrt ~ftb ~taftg 
.. a-ll'.qittghm. ~. <!}. 2.lT.?'l-~ 
April 22, 1976 
/ 
Re: No. 74-1318 - Drew Municipal Separate School 
District v. Katie Mae Andrews 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMl1Ef~S Of" 
~tt lr.tlltt (qMu1 (rf Ut.c 'ntdtc~h-uc~ 
~'rnslrngfon. l{l. <.q. 20gTJt,.;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N 
~' .. 
April 2 6, 1 9 7 6 
Re : No . 74 - 1318- DrewMunidpa1SeparateSchool 
Di strict v. Andrews --··------·-·-------·-- -- ·- ------· ---
Dea r Chief : 
I am content to dismiss the writ in this case as irnprovi-
dently granted . I therefore j oin the per curiam you circulated on 
April 21. 
Sincerely , 
The Chief Justice 
cc : The Conference 
(Blip Opinion) 
NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before pubilcatlon 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
ilminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1318 
Drew Municipal Separate 
School District et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Katie Mae Andrews et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
[May 3, 1976] 
PER CuRIAM. 
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